Superseding Societal Conventions

And He (Hashem) took him (Avraham Avinu) outside, and said, “Gaze, now, towards the heavens, and count the stars if you are able to count them” And he said to him, “So shall your offspring be” – Breishis 15:5

And He took him outside – according to its Midrashic interpretation [Hashem] said to [Avraham] “go out from your astrology which you have seen by the signs of the zodiac that you are not destined to bear a son… – Rashi ad loc., Artscroll Sapirstein edition translation

It is vitally important to periodically step outside ourselves and our society and objectively asses ourselves. Societal assumptions and axioms, follies and foibles often, in ways that go undetected, impose patterns of thought and behavior on a wide range of individuals. Even individuals who do not completely identify with the surrounding society or culture are not necessarily immune. Thus Hakadosh Baruch Hu tells Avraham Avinu, step outside the astrological axioms of society and recognize that these axioms are limiting your faith. Their astrological axioms are not yours; they constrain and contradict your beliefs. And our patriarch responds to the challenge, “and he trusted/believed in Hashem” (ibid 15:6.)

“Tze’ee loch b’ikvei haTzon” (Shir Hashirim 1:8) – follow in the footsteps of the patriarchs – this is the directive Shlomo Hamelech imparts to us. So let us too, for a brief moment, “step outside.”

As outsiders let us attend a professional sporting event. What do we experience? Even as outsiders we might share the insider’s perspective. The intense competition can be gripping, even thrilling. The athleticism on display, replete with extraordinary grace and commensurate skill, posses a definite aesthetic quality. If the sporting event happens to be a baseball game and we posses the poetic imagination of the late A. Bartlett Giamatti, we would see a metaphor for the, “impulse to go out and back, to leave and return home.” (Although I wonder how many, if any, share this imaginative Giamattian perspective on baseball). Even the venue itself, magnificent stadiums, can be particularly impressive.

But as outsiders we would see and experience much, much more…

Continued here: link

And for those who remember, I’m not a football fan either: link

R. Yitzchak Etshalom, in his recently published volume of Between the Lines of the Bible on Exodus and his earlier volume on Genesis, shows us how it is done (note that I was heavily involved in the publication of the first volume and minorly in the second). With his captivating prose, penetrating depth and dazzling breadth, R. Etshalom analyzes topics in the Biblical in classical Brisk fashion.

He starts with a text and asks one or more difficult questions on it. He then proceeds to another, unrelated text and similarly poses difficulties. Each step of the way, tensions between texts and ideas grow as the questions multiply. Conflicts within and between texts multiply as R. Etshalom builds his foundation. Then comes the big idea. With one global concept, a textual or theological insight, the bubble of tension is burst. All of the questions are neatly resolved. Indeed, with the new understanding of the “big idea,” they no longer seem like questions.

Some of this is just a matter of presentation. Schooled in contemporary study of the Talmud, R. Etshalom knows how to “give a shi’ur” and arranges his Bible lessons with the same excitement and structure of a high-level Talmud class. However, he does not merely take Talmudic categories and apply them to the Bible.

One of the biggest puzzles in Exodus is the oversized presence of the Tabernacle. Not only are the instructions for its composition given in exquisite detail, they are presented twice! In three sweeping essays, R. Etshalom demonstrates the importance of the Tabernacle as a continuation of the Sinai revelation, explains the differences between the two Tabernacle accounts based on the differing perspectives if the actors (Moshe and Betzalel), and shows the significance of the adjacent Shabbos passages (both are sanctifications of the Jewish people). His conceptual-theological approach is, it seems to me, entirely appropriate because the Bible is first and foremost a theological text. Building, as he does, on the words and literary character of the text, R. Etshalom’s concepts are organic to the Bible rather than externally imposed.

R. Etshalom is singularly focused on the Biblical text. He tries to tease the true meaning from the text by allowing it to speak for itself. However, he is a sufficiently traditional Torah scholar that when he evaluates ambiguous passages, he builds on the Talmud and famous Jewish commentaries. In doing so, he takes a middle position between Dr. Nehama Leibowitz and R. Yoel Bin-Nun (see here: link). The former focused mainly on commentaries and the latter seldom uses them. R. Etshalom uses them as necessary, focusing on the texts but incorporating traditional commentaries, much like R. Elchanan Samet.

A true pedagogue teaches not only his syllabus but the tools for study. In each essay, R. Etshalom pauses to explain what he did, what interpretive tools he used. His methods are mainly literary but they vary. Sometimes his main idea comes from recognizing key words that link texts, other times by understanding the limitations of what the characters knew at the time. Walking away from the book, you are not only dazzled by R. Etshalom’s interpretations but empowered to study on your own in greater depth.

From R’ Aviner:40 Women Separating Challah
Q: Is there a Segulah for finding a match, healing, fertility, etc. if 40 women separate Challah together on a Friday? Is it permissible for some of the women to separate Challah on Thursday if there is a pressing need?
A: This is a new creation, which has no source. There is certainly a level of holiness in separating Challah – just as there is holiness in the fulfillment of every Mitzvah – but there is no source for 40 women separating it together. It can therefore be performed in this manner.

American
A student introduced himself as an “American”. Our Rabbi pointed out that he is not an American, since America is not our Land. Rather he should say: A Jew from the Exile of America (Iturei Yerushalayim #64).

Chabad
One Chabad publication referred to the house of the Lubavitcher Rebbe outside of Israel as “Beit Chayeinu” (The House of our Life). Our Rabbi responded with great distress: “Have mercy on Zion for it is the House of our Life! How is it possible to call a house in America by this name?!” (Iturei Yerushalayim #64 in the name of Ha-Rav Yitzchak Dadon).

This respectful attitude toward great scholars seems like common sense, but not everyone attains the maturity that enables acknowledging the stature and abilities of your disputants. The student of Talmud will certainly cite the dictum that study partners are supposed to be like enemies while arguing (Kiddushin 30b) and the many Talmudic examples of sharply worded arguments. However, R. Yair Chaim Bachrach (Chavos Yair, no. 152) strongly disputes these proofs. To him, the battle of Torah is fought with proofs and theories, not insults. Rather, the Biblical admonition remains true, “The quiet words of the wise are heeded” (Eccl. 9:17).

A figure in rabbinic history who remains famous for his brilliant, strident arguments is R. Aryeh Leib Ginsburg, author of the Sha’agas Aryeh, Turei Even and Gevuras Ari. His indispensable (pseudo-)responsa and commentaries are replete with sharply worded attacks on those whose arguments found disfavor in his eyes. His legendary righteousness leaves the reasons for his harsh attacks unclear. However, yeshiva legend deflates his example for contemporary students and scholars based on a story of his death which R. Zev Eleff explores in an essay in the latest issue of The Jewish Review of Books (“The Wages of Criticism”). The first and most powerful story is told in R. Aharon Marcus’ 1901 Der Chassidismus:

[R. Ginsburg] died in Metz at the age of 97 as a result of an accident that took place when a bookcase fell down on top of him. He remained buried for a half an hour until relatives found him. When he was unburied and restored to his regular position he said in Hebrew that all of the authors attacked him for ignoring their writings and arguing with their positions. For a half an hour he appeased them all, save for one: “the bad tempered Levush” (Rabbi Mordechai Yaffe), who did not forgive him. Because of this, he knew he would soon die.

The Sha’agas Aryeh was killed by his own sharp words, as the books he disputed collapsed on him. While the veracity of this story is highly questionable, as R. Eleff demonstrates, its repetition, albeit with variations, within the world of the yeshiva teaches students an important lesson that demonstrates the value of intellectual humility. R. Eleff continues:

The story of the Sha’agat Aryeh’s death remains a part of yeshiva folklore. I first heard it from Rabbi Hershel Schachter, who heard it from his father, who heard it when he was a yeshiva student. Although it has been decoupled from Marcus’ Hasidic polemic, it still warns those who would presume to criticize the intellectual abilities or interpretive authority of the saintly rabbis of yesteryear. Ginsburg’s books are on the shelves of any well-furnished rabbinic library, but his willingness to unabashedly criticize earlier authorities has not, by and large, been followed by subsequent generations of rabbinic scholars. On the contrary, he is remembered—whether it happened to him or not—for being a harsh critic who died at the hands, or bindings, of those he criticized.

I would like here to briefly discuss the issue from the perspective of Conservative interpretations of halakhah, not because I believe they merit a place within traditional halakhic deliberation but because I see value in recognizing that even non-Orthodox scholars of Jewish law, who are often much more inclined to leniency, accept the concept of retroactive annulment of conversions in certain circumstances. (Note to avoid confusion: All rabbis quoted below are Conservative)

In a 1982 responsum on Reform conversions (link – PDF), R. David Novak argued that if the conversion deliberately omitted immersion in a mikvah, it is invalid because it demonstrates a failure to accept the rules of Jewish law. “This does not mean that the convert is expected to observe every aspect of Jewish law — clearly an impossible demand, intellectually, morally and religiously. Rather, it means that conversion must involve an unconditional acceptance of the valid authority of Jewish law and an initial rejection of none of its specifics… I find no cogent basis in halakhah for accepting, even ex post facto, converts who did not undergo specific tevilah for the sake of conversion, unless it can be shown that they are strictly observant Jews, particularly scrupulous in the use of a mikvah.” (pp. 7-8 of PDF) R. Novak recognizes the possibility of retroactively annulling a conversion due to failure to accept the commandments. While he allows for non-observance (and strangely claims that it is unreasonable to expect a convert to be fully observant), he does not accept, even ex post facto, a conversion where the prospective convert implicitly rejects even a single Torah law.

In a 1984 responsum on whether rabbis are obligated to inquire about the Jewish status of a bride and groom before performing a wedding, R. Joel Roth assumes that some conversions are invalid (link – PDF). “As regrettable as the fact may be, it is virtually undeniable that a presumption of a halakhically valid conversion without proof or verification thereof is radically weakened today by our reality. Therefore, an investigation of its kashrut is not only desirable, but necessary even if we had no prior knowledge of the gentile status of the convert.” (p. 3 of PDF) And further, “because the negative consequences of the marriage of a Jew to one improperly converted are very great, we too should insist on proof or verification of a valid conversion before permitting the marriage — me’alah asu beyuhasin.” (p. 4)

In a 1989 responsum, R. Steven Saltzman responded to a case of two Arabs who converted to Judaism under false pretenses in order to become Israeli citizens under the Law of Return (link – PDF). I’m not sure what they gained from it but they immediately moved to an Arab village where they could not practice Judaism. R. Saltzman argues that religiously improper behavior subsequent to conversion is insufficient to annul it. However, “[w]here it can be clearly demonstrated that the proselyte acted dishonestly, withholding information vital to [the converting court's] ability to make a coherent decision [on the convert's sincerity], then the conversion may be considered null and void.” (p. 9 of PDF) In a concurring 1989 responsum, R. Avram Reisner examines the core texts regarding annulments and presumptions of validity of conversions (link – PDF). While he limits the cases where annulment is possible, he allows for it where “the converts appear to have perpretrated a fraud with no intention whatsoever to function as Jews…” (p. 4 of PDF)

More recently, R. Wayne Allen addressed this issue in his Further Perspectives on Jewish Law (pp. 259-267) and offered a view I find puzzling. He begins a discussion of retroactive nullification of conversion by exploring the requirements to serve on a rabbinical court for conversion. Quoting scholars such as the Maharam Schick, Maharatz Chajes, R. Maurice Lamm and R. Marc Angel, he objects to the idea that a judge for conversion must have specific beliefs. Rather, he accepts anyone who is knowledgeable in the laws of conversion, even if he is not a rabbi.

However, he adds two further qualifications: the person must not be otherwise barred from serving as a judge, and a non-observant rabbi, who knows the laws but fails to fulfill them, is also invalid as a judge for conversion (“[s]uch people are disqualified from serving on any Bet Din”, p. 267). The first qualification seems to me to bar anyone with heretical beliefs and the second would bar most non-Orthodox rabbis. Which means that R. Allen effectively agrees with those who retroactively annul (most) non-Orthodox conversions. But that is beside the point.

What if one of the conversion judges fails to meet R. Allen’s criteria? “[S]o long as the judges who serve on a rabbinical court for conversion are well-trained in those laws and knowledgeable of them, and so long as they are not otherwise legally barred from acting as judges, the conversions performed by them are valid.” (p. 66) In other words, if any of the judges is legally barred from serving on the court for conversion then the conversion is retroactively invalid despite the fact that the prospective convert immersed and was circumcised. R. Allen agrees with the concept of retroactive nullification of conversions if a judge is invalid but disagrees with overly broad invalidations.

None of the above Conservative scholars believe in willy-nilly nullifying conversions, wreaking havoc on people’s lives. Nor do they believe that sincere converts should live their lives in constant fear of losing their status in the community they have overturned their lives to join. That notwithstanding, they accept that some conversions are completely invalid and effectively null and void.

• Majesty and Humility: The Thought of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik by R. Reuven Ziegler (Urim & OU Press)
• Jewish Prayer: The Right Way, Resolving Halachic Dilemmas by R. J. Simcha Cohen (Urim)
• Torah Tapestries: Words of Wisdom Woven from the Weekly Parsha – Shemos by Shira Smiles (Feldheim)

You’re just not going to believe this one…..

From the Sefer Kushiot #11

Q. Why is there a custom for those gathered at a wedding to slap the designated witnesses as the kiddushin is taking place?

A. It derives from the fact that the laws of marriage and kinyanim (acquisitions[1]) are derived from the words “kicha, kicha” (meaning “to take” or “to acquire”), that appear in the context of Avraham purchasing the Machpela cave from Ephron. Since “kicha” has the same gematria as “ketata” (fighting) and we are taught that there is no marriage that does not include some fights and arguments, the witnesses are slapped by everyone present in the hope that any fighting that might have been decreed upon the couple be discharged right then and there through the slapping of the witnesses.

Another version of the Sefer Kushiot manuscript has it that the two witnesses are simply to slap one another without the “participation” of everyone gathered. Additionally, in a footnote on this entry in the Rabbi Yakov Stahl edition of Sefer Kushiot there is a closely related custom cited for the groom to slap the bride under the chuppa until her tooth falls out [!]. This, again, in order for the slapping to discharge any fighting that might have been decreed upon the couple. With this slap, the kiddushin was said to be complete.

Wow.