Why can’t women count in a minyan for prayer? R. Aryeh Frimer wrote a definitive article on the subject over twenty years ago (link). What follows is my own summary of his article, presented mainly to emphasize the broad consensus on the point that women cannot be counted.
There are three schools of thought on this:
I. One school posits that women are never counted in any minyan for any subject, even something in which they are obligated. Tosafos (Berakhos 45b sv. ve-ha), Ran (Megillah 5a) and other rishonim adopt this approach. Among acharonim, the Vilna Gaon (Bi’ur Ha-Gra, Orach Chaim 199:6), Shulchan Arukh Ha-Rav (199:6-7; 263:22; kuntres acharon 7), Minchas Chinukh (296:10), Or Samei’ach (Hilkhos Berakhos 5:3), Binyan Tziyon (vol. 2 no. 8 ) and others follow this approach. Different reasons are offered, which include comparisons to the biblical censuses in the desert, inheritance of land in Israel, prior obligations to family and public vs. private roles.
II. Another approach counts women for a minyan in anything for which they are completely obligated. Since they are not obligated in public prayer, they do not count for that minyan. This approach is adopted by the Shevus Ya’akov (Orach Chaim 3:54), Teshuvah Me-Ahavah (2:229), Toras Chesed (Orach Chaim 4), Tzitz Eliezer (9:11) and others.
III. A third approach distinguishes between a minyan required to publicize a matter and a minyan that is intrinsic to the performance of a ritual. Women count for the former but not the latter. The Re’ah, quoted by the Ritva (Megillah 4a), adopts this approach. The Chazon Ish (Orach Chaim 155:2), R. Chaim Sonnenfeld (Salmas Chaim 1:101), R. Tzvi Pesach Frank (Mikra’ei Kodesh, Purim 35, 50 n. 3), R. Ovadiah Yosef (Yalkut Yosef, p. 90) and others follow this approach.
The details of this debate are reflected practically in a number of cases. For example, can women count for a minyan in the reading of Parashas Zakhor, assuming they are obligated in it? Can they count for a minyan in the reading of megillah or the public lighting of a Chanukah menorah? The approach you follow will determine your answer to these questions.
However, there is a universal consensus that women cannot count in a minyan for public prayer.
(See also this post: link)
Despite the many comments not one person has addressed the heart of the issue. If Rabbeinu Tam explains the reason why non-adult males should be excluded from minyan is because it shows a lack of “yekara demalka”-loosely translated “honor of G-d”, can someone really argue that in Modern Orthodox communities and everything to the left, one would be hard pressed to argue that in communities where women can reach the highest office, including women in a minyan is an affront to the G-d’s honor. And please no meta-halakhaic answers. Just pretend we are in a Beis Midrash for a second- and just give me a good svara!
Avi: The point is that Rabbenu Tam’s view is a minority opinion that most poskim do not allow even in an emergency situation. It is not normative.
Since the answer was one of process…
Nor, of course, are married women owning property (mid-late 19th century) or having the right to vote (early 20th century) normative.
Whereas, polygamy was normative enough such that Rabeinu Gershom to put an end to it.
Normative, in itself, is not sole mechanism of the halachic process. The loopholes that allow change are, by definition, not normative.
Nachum – maybe the problem is that it has become acceptable to see things as an Ashkenazi-issue exclusively in an area of Halacha that touches on all of us. And again, not to excuse the pick a posek (however obscure) approach that I personally disagree with, but at least with the Ben Ish Chai you are talking about THE posek of the majority of the Sephardic world. Its interesting to note however that what he recommends is that when a girl turns twelve that she be given a new dress to mark the occasion, and for her to say shehecheyanu to mark her entry in the world of Jewish adulthood. To me, this is closer to the halachic opinion that one should buy his wife jewelry and nice clothes to mark the chagim by increasing her simchah, than it is to serve as license for a party no matter how tastefully done. The Ben Ish Chai’s approach seems to take into account the sensitivities of a girl wanting to mark a milestone, within the framework of practice that was appropriate for the societal norms. In studying his work it becomes clear that the concern for tzeniut amongst the holy people of Baghdad was so great that wives would not eat in the same room as their husbands, so as not to result in the development of any disgust from watching each other eat. Obviously it was a very different culture, but understanding that helps place the Ben Ish Chai’s statements on marking a Bat Mitzvah in an appropriate light.
sy guy, all fair. I meant to point out that these debates don’t really happen in the Sephardic world. The most secular Israeli Sepharadi wouldn’t dream of praying in an “egalitarian” place.
As to the status of the Ben Ish Chai, that’s sort of a recent invention. He has a status similar to the Chafetz Chaim among Ashkenazim in that regard, for similar reasons. I highly doubt you get an accurate picture of everyday life from his work.
Joseph Kaplan wrote in part:
“That’s where you start the slippery slope. Of course, there are thoseto the right of you who would make the same general comment but would start a bit sooner; i.e., ” a continuum of thought that views teaching women Torah shebe’al peh, having bat mitzvot, WTGs etc.” But you wouldn’t like because it would include you in that slippery slope, so you start right after your changes in traditional halachic practice”
Ain Haci Nami-but not IMO all that relevant to the discussion.
Steve, it is relevant in that it demonstrates the decision as to where the so-called slippery slope is positioned is a political issue. I.e. the same halachic process can be used at any place in this continuum to effect change, if there is a will.
>“If Rabbeinu Tam explains the reason why non-adult males should be excluded from minyan is because it shows a lack of “yekara demalka”-loosely translated “honor of G-d”, can someone really argue that in Modern Orthodox communities and everything to the left, one would be hard pressed to argue that in communities where women can reach the highest office, including women in a minyan is an affront to the G-d’s honor.”
Can you explain why contemporary Western women’s freedom to hold high office is halakhically relevant to the question of y’kara d’shmaya?
STBO,
Can you explain why you think that counting in a minyan would show lack of y’kara d’shmaya?
STBO,
To answer the question one need merely approach the issue with some common sense. (I really hope that common sense has not yet been rejected as a legitimate tool in learning.) Why are certain tefilos only said with a Minyan? For the simple reason that when at least 10 people are gathered together in tefliah a particular kind of setting has been created and greater glory is given to G-d. “Berov Am Hadras Melech”. The spiritual “advantage” having a Minyan is manifest in being able to special tefilos like Borechu (it’s the best example because the words itself express the fact that a special kind of praise is being given-Borechu-belashon rabim- because a number of people are gathered together and thus it is said responsively-as are most devraim shebikedusha . Something said responsively enhances the “tzibur” experience).
The affect and advantage of having a large group of people gathered together is only if they are, for the lack of a better term, “full representatives” of the community. 10 adults gathered is “berov am hadras melech”. 10 chidren are not. For example, if someone wanted 200 people to show up to their daughter’s wedding to give her and the chasan honor, if 200 children showed up that would clearly not do the job. In the times of Rabbeinu Tam the same was true for women.
I would agree that in Meah Shearim and most communities in places like Monsey, women would not be able to counted in a minyan. In those communities women are not seen as being full representatives of the community. However, in most MO communities and everything to the left when 10 women are gathered that is not seen as being any less significant as 10 men. To use the wedding analogy again it would be a success if 100 Modern Orthodox women and 100 men showed up to the wedding.
R’ Gil, I wasn’t asking about Rabbeinu Tam’s kula to allow one child. I was talking about his reason of yekara demalka. I don’t believe that you can say that Rabbeinu Tam’s understanding of what Minyan is about is not normative. In any event, you responded, as I thought you would with a meta-halakhic answer: “its not normative”. I was asking for a svara. Please anyone show the weakness in my svara above.
>“STBO,
Can you explain why you think that counting in a minyan would show lack of y’kara d’shmaya?”
I’d start by noting the fact that Rabbeinu Tam seems to think so as well.
Now why did Rabbeinu Tam believe this? I don’t know, but he doesn’t hint that it has to do with women’s non-holding of high office.
My own view is that public tefillah and public religiosity, specifically religious officiation, are roles that the Torah wanted men to hold, not women. There was after all no shortage of high priestesses and other female religious officiators in the ancient world. The Torah’s delegation of such roles exclusively to men seems to mark a conscious break with that paradigm.
Why was such a break made? I suspect it has to do with what God wants for the development of Am Yisrael and humanity, and the different roles that the masculine and feminine play in the human psyche and society. One could certainly continue at length on this topic (it’s among the most important in the world)….but that’s the opening of my own thoughts.
This discussion now enters upon territory that asserts fundamental differences between male and female, and masculinity and femininity, and so will be very uncomfortable for many.
“This discussion now enters upon territory that asserts fundamental differences between male and female, and masculinity and femininity, and so will be very uncomfortable for many.”
Go on, then… These “uncomfortable” views should be understood by anyone engaging in this discussion.
I’m happy that finally, although the amount of comments have dropped off, the conversation has stopped hiding behind abstract meta-halakhic claims, and has begun to deal with the heart of the issue, namely, according to the Torah are women ontologically not fir or suited for a public role. I’ve never understood why the obvious source for this question is ignored. After the sin in gan eden, G-d curses the woman that “Hu Yimshal Bach”. Clearly, that has been the situation for millenia. In other words, the Torah seems to be saying that the position of women in society is a result of the curse. The most importnat question in all of this is whether it is permitted or perhaps even desired that human beings overcome the curse. I am not aware of poskim who prohibit women from taking an epidural because of “betztev teldi banim” or people from using mechanized farm equipment because of “bezeias apeicha tochal lechem”. In fact, Rashi brings down the midrash that Noach was called Noach because he brought rest to human beings who toiled since the curse to work the land, by creating the first plow. In other words, Noach was Noach becuase he overcame the curse!
“Who cares what Sperber and Weiss think? They are not the Gedolim and not even close. If you’re going to quote someone, it should be someone in the category of a Rav Elyashiv or a Kanievsky.”
Reality check: In my community, I don’t know anyone who pays attention to what Rav Elyashiv has to say and most people have never heard of Rav Kanievsky. That is not a slur on them but a statement of how irrelevant the Charedi gedolim have made themselves.
‘Charlie Hall, who raised the issue, likes to bring up obscure precedents (especially Italian) to support modern points of view.’
I was merely objecting to the “beyond the pale” statement. I have no idea whether people actually followed him on this. A lot of things thought to be beyond the pale actually aren’t.
Case in point: In Rabbi Emanuel Feldman’s article in the current *Jewish Action*, he brings up an incident when he was asked to wear a black robe. He in explaining his reasoning for refusing to do so, he writes that “there are certain behaviors that are so obviously off track—what we call muvan me’eilav, and lawyers call “res ipsa loquitur,” something that speaks for itself and is self-evident—that it need not be recorded in a code of law.”
Now I am not about to question Rabbi Feldman’s decision, but is is a simple fact that rabbis in many communities were wearing robes long before they were wearing fedoras! Here is an example, from *Minhagim of the Congreation Shearith Israel In the City of New York* by Rabbi Hayyim J. Angel (2009), p. 17:
“Many Rabbis and Hazanim throughout the Jewish world have worn distinctive garb. The kohanim in Temple times did so also. Wearing distinctive clothing serves as a means of minimizing the person as opposed to the position, and adds prestige to the position itself.”
“Often enough, Jews have borrowed ideas from their neighbors. Our current garb parallels the outfits worn in many Jewish congregations throughout Western Europe. Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch of 19th century Germany wore similar canonicals.”
“Hazanim in our congregation after Hazan Moses Levi Maduro Peixotto (1767-1828), who served from 1816-1828, wore a gown as we now know it today. Hazan Peixotto used to wear knee breeches, a suit with a long black silk train, a white collar, and bands made of lace. Instead of a cap he was wearing a three corner cocked hat. This new style of pulpit wear took hold in the 19th century, and it is called the Geneva style. This style is based on Academic Regalia for doctoral graduates (see Dr. David de Sola Pool’s *An Old Faith in the New World). ”
Not only are robes not self-evidently “off-track” they are now long-established minhagim in some communities. At Shearith Israel the rabbis even wear black robes for weekday mincha and arvit!
“My own view is that public tefillah and public religiosity, specifically religious officiation, are roles that the Torah wanted men to hold, not women.”
That is a difficult position given that public tefillah is a d’rabbanan.
“The Torah’s delegation of such roles exclusively to men seems to mark a conscious break with that paradigm.”
Also difficult given that the number of Torah mitzvot applicable today in which men have a chiyuv and women do not is only about a dozen.
“Also difficult ”
By that I meant to apply to our own times. Particularly when there are zero female Muslim religious leaders today, and zero female Catholic priests, to totally deny religious leadership to women is following the ways of the two largest non-Jewish religions in the world.
I have no strong desire to launch into an extended monograph re: my theories of why the Torah (both Written and Oral) seems to delineate religious officiation so firmly as being in the province of the male sex. Such writing would go on for a looooong time, and I also think an anonymous online forum would be a poor venue to attempt to flesh out that skeleton.
Re: the curses/consequences following the fruit, none of those curses are mitzvot — they’re descriptions of an existential reality into which humans are cast. If you want to argue that we can now ‘overcome the curse’ by reforming halacha such that women may constitute a minyan….well, the first thing I’d ask is why nobody else has thought of this…?
The second thing I’d note is that nothing in halacha forbids either epidural anesthetics or mechanized agricultural equipment. But halacha does set out clear qualifications for constituent members of a minyan.
>“That is a difficult position given that public tefillah is a d’rabbanan.”
Why is that difficult? In principle it’s a simple progression from the operational guidelines of the Beit ha’Mikdash. Particularly if one considers the general theme of tefilla sublimating the service formerly undertaken in the Beit ha’Mikdash….“u’nshalma parim sfateinu”. It would be thematically consistent that officiation and operation of the service remain in the purview of male leadership.
>“Also difficult given that the number of Torah mitzvot applicable today in which men have a chiyuv and women do not is only about a dozen.”
???
What’s the relevance?
>“By that I meant to apply to our own times. Particularly when there are zero female Muslim religious leaders today, and zero female Catholic priests, to totally deny religious leadership to women is following the ways of the two largest non-Jewish religions in the world.”
Ah-ha! So in the interests of Jewish separatism we must alter halacha to permit female religious officiation!
This is really gunning for the Too Clever by Half Award….
STBO, shame you enticed us then at 10:40 last night. Out of curiousity, does this same type of analysis also lead to un-PC views regarding non-Jews in general and black people in particular?
Apologies for any unnecessary enticement.
>“Out of curiousity, does this same type of analysis also lead to un-PC views regarding non-Jews in general and black people in particular?”
???
I’m mystified by what you believe the connection between these topics should be. But your imputations are both clear and dishonorable.
My apologies, STBO, for conflating your stated view with others who share it together with other views. It was wrong of me to make that assumption.
That said, as I was sitting in shul today, I was trying to reconcile the beginning of this weeks’s Haftorah:
וּדְבוֹרָה אִשָּׁה נְבִיאָה, אֵשֶׁת לַפִּידוֹת–הִיא שֹׁפְטָה אֶת-יִשְׂרָאֵל, בָּעֵת הַהִיא
וַיַּעֲלוּ אֵלֶיהָ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, לַמִּשְׁפָּט
with your statement:
“My own view is that public tefillah and public religiosity, specifically religious officiation, are roles that the Torah wanted men to hold, not women. There was after all no shortage of high priestesses and other female religious officiators in the ancient world. The Torah’s delegation of such roles exclusively to men seems to mark a conscious break with that paradigm.”
Avi wrote:
“Despite the many comments not one person has addressed the heart of the issue. If Rabbeinu Tam explains the reason why non-adult males should be excluded from minyan is because it shows a lack of “yekara demalka”-loosely translated “honor of G-d”, can someone really argue that in Modern Orthodox communities and everything to the left, one would be hard pressed to argue that in communities where women can reach the highest office, including women in a minyan is an affront to the G-d’s honor. And please no meta-halakhaic answers. Just pretend we are in a Beis Midrash for a second- and just give me a good svara”
WADR, if you don’t accept meta-halachic answers, the discussion reveals more about your lack of knowledge about Mesorah and TSBP than you care to admit. Merely knowing Shas, Rishonim and Acharonim inside out without taking into consideration meta halachic factors reveals one that knows a lot, but is unwilling to view an issue from the perspective of wprking from the reality and perspectives of Chazal, Rishonim and Acharonim and instead imposing your views or worse, how Chazal, Rishonim and Acharonim should be reread to accomodate your perspective on any issue.
I am glad you’re not conflating my views with unknown others’ views of other subjects that may be noxious.
>“That said, as I was sitting in shul today, I was trying to reconcile the beginning of this weeks’s Haftorah:
וּדְבוֹרָה אִשָּׁה נְבִיאָה, אֵשֶׁת לַפִּידוֹת–הִיא שֹׁפְטָה אֶת-יִשְׂרָאֵל, בָּעֵת הַהִיא
וַיַּעֲלוּ אֵלֶיהָ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, לַמִּשְׁפָּט
with your statement…”
What is the relevance? Do you deny that “the Torah delegated such roles [high priests and religious officiation in the Beit Ha'mikdash] exclusively to men”? Do you really think that every posek, talmid chacham, rav, tanna, amora, gaon, rishon and acharon missed the beginning of this week’s haftarah until you came along and noticed it???
Come on.
Perhaps they were familiar with Devorah, and the 7 recorded nevi’ot and (per the Gemara) the hundreds of thousands of male and female nevi’im who were not recorded for posterity. Perhaps the halacha regarding minyan and religious officiation was established and remains what it is for a reason or many reasons that are aware of the above and Devorah’s exceptional identity as a judge and leader. (As for that matter was the halacha regarding the constitution of a Beit Din…)
What is certain is that many aside from yourself, both before our time and in it have noticed the opening verses of this week’s haftarah. Those verses were never seen as motive to upend the halacha regarding religious officiation or constitution of either a minyan or Beit Din.
Come on yourself.
There is no doubt that by Mishnaic time, the societal context relegated women to non-leadership roles. But, this was not the case in the Tanach.
So, when applied to the Tanach, your assertion to which I was responding is false.
And on your Beit ha’Mikdash example, do you also extrapolate the Torah wanted only male Cohanim for religious officiation?
Have you learned Tanach?
Even in Tanach, Devorah was a pointed exception to the norm. Which makes citations of Devorah in an effort to reform normative halacha so out of place and IMO almost absurd. (As would be attempts to enlist Queen Shlomtzion/’Salome’.)
Re: kohanim, only male kohanim had a part in the officiation of the Beit ha’Mikdash. (For that matter only males were obligated in the thrice-yearly fulfillment of re’iyah at the Beit ha’Mikdash.)
The distinction between male and female is much more fundamental than the distinction between kohen and non-kohen.
If your position is that almost every posek, talmid chacham, rav, tanna, amora, gaon, rishon and acharon until yourself has misunderstood the Torah and halacha….. well good luck arguing that. But I think it’s an obvious non-starter.
Alternatively you could assert that irrespective of the halacha, the moral demands of the moment simply require that halacha be reformed or overturned to permit women (and minors, and others?…) to be constitutive members of a minyan, etc. You think that argument will go somewhere? Then run with it.
At least a couple of academics, shuls, and rabbis in NYC and Jerusalem agree with both claims.
Mainstream Torah observant Judaism, however, will not. And your obvious presumption that those who disagree with you (i.e. those who follow and endorse normative halacha) are moral pygmies will be one of the prime factors that sinks your ship.
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